The extent of and changes in inter-generational mobility of wealth are central to understanding dynamics of wealth inequality but hard to measure. Using estate tax returns data, we observe that the share of women among the very wealthy (top 0.01%) in the United States peaked in the late 1960s, reaching almost 50%. Three decades on, women's share had declined to one third, a return to pre-war levels. We argue that this pattern mirrors the relative importance of inherited vs. self-made wealth in the economy and thus the gender-composition of the wealthiest may serve as a proxy for inter-generational wealth mobility. This proxy for "dynastic wealth" suggests that wealth mobility in the past century decreased until the 1970s and rose thereafter, a pattern consistent with technological change driving long term trends in income inequality and mobility. Greater wealth mobility in recent decades is also consistent with the simultaneous rise in top income shares and relatively stable wealth concentration.
Introduction
The share of women among the very wealthy peaked in the late 1960s. According to estate tax returns, in 1925 one quarter of the wealthiest 0.01 percent was women. This fraction rose rapidly through World War II (WWII) and then more slowly to peak in 1969, when women neared parity with men. Since then, the decline has been marked. By 2000, women's share had fallen to one-third, its pre-war level. While the rise was evident among all wealth groups in the top 1 percent of the wealth distribution, the decline was confined to the very top. Figure 1a graphs the share of women for four different groups in the top 1 percent among decedents by year. Figure 1b does the same for the "living" population with the help of estate-multipliers (a method that treats death as a random sampling device and uses mortality rates by age and gender to infer the distribution of wealth among the living, as described in the Data Appendix).
This decline in the share of women in the top wealth groups took place against a backdrop of unprecedented economic emancipation. Moreover, women's progress in the labor market has not been confined to the lower rungs. Social Security data analyzed by Kopczuk et al. (2007) reveal that since the 1970s there has been a steady increase of women among top earners: in the highest category they analyze (top 0.1 percent), women's share increased by a factor of six. We argue that rather than reflecting women's labor market status, the presence of women among the very wealthy may mirror the relative importance of inherited vs. self-made wealth.
Such a pattern could follow if men make wealth, but both men and women inherit it. 1 If so, changes to the gender wealth distribution may serve as a gauge of inter-generational wealth mobility at the top, an entity on which there is little information.
Our gender proxy for wealth mobility among the wealthy suggests that inter-generational wealth mobility decreased in the period 1925-1969 and increased thereafter. Higher wealth mobility in recent decades coincides with a rise in income concentration (Piketty and Saez, 2003) . It is also noteworthy in light of the recent finding that top shares of wealth have increased very slowly or even remained constant (Kennickell, 2003; Scholz, 2003; Kopczuk and Saez, 2004a) , which has raised the question why income and wealth concentrations do not move in lock-step. The contrast between income and wealth concentration patterns is illustrated on figures 2a and 2b. Our findings suggest a potential reconciliation. While wealth concentration has remained stable, the composition of the wealthy may have changed. Less dynastic and more self-made wealth at the top is consistent with Piketty and Saez's (2003) 1 We provide some supportive evidence that this assumption applies to the wealthy in the United States during the 20 th century in Section 3.3.
in 1875 through its end year 1950. Third, if the share of women among top wealth groups reflects the importance of inherited wealth, we would expect (the inverse of) measures of entrepreneurship to vary accordingly. Using Census data from the Integrated Public Use Microdata Series (IPUMS), we find that the fraction of the labor force who are employers (a potential gauge of entrepreneurship) exhibited a U-shaped pattern over the last century.
A note on terminology is warranted. We favor a distinction based on how wealth was primarily obtained: inherited (or bequeathed) or self-made. We will use the terms "rentiers"
and "entrepreneurs" to denote those who inherited and made their wealth respectively, unless otherwise specified.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents our primary data source -tabulations derived from the administrative estate tax data base -and supplementary data in the form of rich-lists. Section 3 presents a simple descriptive model that highlights mechanisms that could drive changes in the gender and marital composition of the wealthy.
We use this model to evaluate the plausibility of our hypothesis and to infer the importance of inherited vs. self-made fortunes. We then discuss the validity of our key assumption that wealthy women at the top arrive at wealth through inheritance, and show direct evidence of changes to the relative importance of inherited and self-made wealth from rich-lists. In section 4, we consider a number of alternative hypotheses, chief among which is changes to the tax code, changes which impact the tax-minimizing allocation of wealth between spouses. The marriage market changed substantially as well. Specifically, we discuss the role of divorce laws liberalization and changing norms for spousal allocation of property. Finally, we discuss the role of changes to the distribution of estates between community and non-community property states. Section 5 concludes with a fuller discussion of how our finding relates to the literature on the role of technological change and income concentration.
Data
Our main data source is the set of tabulations based on micro estate tax data collected by the Statistics of Income Division of the Internal Revenue Service (IRS). The database of estate tax returns contains all returns filed since the introduction of the federal estate tax in 1916 through 1945, samples for 1962, 1965, 1969, 1972, 1976 and all years after 1982 . Our data cover the period 1925-2000. 3 The data contain most of the information recorded on the tax returns, including basic demographic characteristic such as age, gender, marital status and state of residence. Although the database itself is confidential, we obtained very detailed tabulations by finely defined wealth categories, marital property regime in place in the state of residence (not available in 1962 and 1972) , marital status (not available in 1965) and gender. We will concentrate on groups within the wealthiest .4%. 4 We will study both the distribution of decedents and the distribution of the living constructed from estate tax returns. For the latter, we will employ the estate multiplier methodology as in Kopczuk and Saez (2004a) and further discussed in the Appendix. The estate multiplier methodology amounts to weighting the population by the inverse of the mortality rate, essentially treating death as a random sampling device. As mentioned, Figure 1a show the evolution over the past century of the fraction of women among decedents in the top 1 percent divided in four categories: the wealthiest 0.01% (P99.99-100), the wealthiest 0.10%, those between the top 0.10% and the top 0.40% (P99. 60-99.90) , and finally those between the top 0.40% and the top 1% (P99-99.6). 5 Figure 1b shows the same series for "the living," where the data has been weighed by the estate multipliers. 6
There are two (not mutually exclusive) ways of viewing the difference between patterns emerging for decedents and the living. First, mechanically, estate-multiplier weighting puts greater emphasis on younger individuals. Second, and relatedly, the estate multiplier technique shows values more representative of the whole population not just because of mortality-adjusted weighting, but also because estates of younger decedents are much less likely to be skewed by any tax-motivated planning. For instance, Kopczuk (2007) found that a substantial share of tax-motivated adjustments takes place following the onset of a terminal illness. Since younger individuals are more likely to have died unexpectedly, these types of adjustments are less important for the young. Lastly, the series for the living allows for differences in the age profile of wealth for men and women (and can thus account for differences in the length of time a person was wealthy).
3 A more detailed description of the 1916-1945 data can be found in McCubbin (1990) , while the post-1945 studies are described in Johnson (1994) . Between 1916 Between -1924 we have no information about marital status. 4 Due to the varying coverage of the estate tax, this is the largest group for which we can construct shares for all years. 5 Wealth thresholds in 2000 (2000 dollars) were 24,415,150, 5,503,678, 2,139,887 and 1,172,896 respectively. 6 All figures based on estate tax returns use shares based on years t − 2 to t + 2 (when adjacent years are available).
Other data sources. Since 1982, the Forbes magazine has published an annual list of the richest 400 Americans (the top 2% of our top group P99.99-100). Forbes attributes wealth to the person mainly responsible for its generation and not its ownership, a method which is likely to introduce a male bias compared to the estate tax data (e.g., only Bill Gates appears on the list, not his spouse). Forbes does not rely on administrative data and it may be that wealthy women are less visible than wealthy men, e.g., from being less activist owners.
For earlier periods, information is less comprehensive. We present data from A Classification of American Wealth, "an online book being presently written by Drew Caradine Shouter (pseudonym) who has been studying the subject of wealth accumulation and society in America for many years." The website contains lists of wealthy Americans, their biographies, family trees etc. and is compiled based on various historical sources. 7
We will also make limited use of the list of some 4,000 millionaires in 1892 published by the New York Tribune.
Both the Forbes list and the Classification contain information about the source of wealth, and specify whether it was inherited. The New York Tribune list does not contain an explicit indicator for inheritance, but it does contain a description of the source of wealth that we rely on to assign the inheritance status, as described in the Data Appendix. None of the lists specifies explicitly the gender of the person. We assigned gender relying on first names and other available information using the algorithm described in the Data Appendix.
We also use the Integrated Public Use Microdata Series (Ruggles et al., 2004) extracts from Censuses for 1920 through 2000. The Data Appendix discusses in more detail how we processed various data sources.
Gender and inter-generational wealth mobility
In this section we first formulate a simple descriptive model of asset devolution in which only men generate wealth but both men and women inherit. We use the model to estimate the shares of rentiers and self-made among the wealthy using the estate tax data. We find that the implied share of entrepreneurs in the economy follows a U-shaped pattern over the study period, 1925-2000 . We then consider those who never married. Simply put, if sons and daughters inherit equally, we would expect the surplus of men over women in this group to 7 A Classification of American Wealth is available at http://www.raken.com/american wealth/index.asp.
Currently, it is a subscription based product. We are grateful to the author for permission to use some of this information in this paper.
reflect the importance of entrepreneurs. Indeed, the share of never married men over never married women in the estate data also follows a U-shaped pattern. Next, we discuss patterns emerging from the Forbes 400 list and A Classification of American Wealth. The shares of women and rentiers are highly correlated in these lists, and the lists corroborate the pattern found in the estate tax returns. Finally, we show that patterns of entrepreneurship over the course of the 20 th century are also consistent with other evidence.
Alternative explanations such as changes to the tax code, changing social norms for intrafamily distribution of assets, divorce and remarriage, and compositional changes to the domiciles of the wealthy (community vs. common law states) are discussed in Section 4.
Modelling the wealth distribution of ever-married decedents
For simplicity, our model describes population in a particular year i, ignoring cross-dependence over time. As a convention, we will use Greek symbols for parameters that we will estimate (α, γ and σ) and Latin letters (b and c) for those whose values we will assume. Subscript i denotes calendar time.
Consider a world where only men generate wealth but both men and women inherit. We will provide evidence supporting this assumption in Section 3.3. For simplicity, assume that everybody marries once and is survived by one son and one daughter, and there is no divorce.
Clearly, the gender wealth distribution among decedents will depend on which spouse dies first, how much of the estate is passed on to the surviving spouse, how long he or she continues to live, and what fraction of the initial wealth passes to the son and daughter respectively.
However, conditional on the value of these parameters at any particular time, wealth held by women would decrease in times of new wealth accumulation and increase as this wealth is passed down the generations, unless new wealth is created.
To further fix ideas, we assume that there are two kinds of couples among the wealthy:
rentiers and entrepreneurs.
Rentier couples can derive their wealth from either the husband or the wife. 8 We denote by 1 − α i the fraction of couples of this kind in year i. We assume that the person who inherited wealth will be subject to the estate tax while the spouse falls below the threshold, regardless
8 If both members of the couple were rentiers, this is equivalent to two couples with one rentier each. Our model cannot distinguish between those two cases. If there are couples with two rentiers, αi needs to be reinterpreted accordingly. Implicitly, we assume that the frequency of rentiers marrying each other has not changed over time.
of the order of death. That is, we assume that the rentier does not bequeath enough wealth to the surviving spouse for us to observe both in our data. Our key assumption is that the rentier sex ratio is constant and more female than the entrepreneur sex ratio. For simplicity, we will assume that there are equally many men and women rentiers, i.e., on average, we observe .5 men and .5 women per rentier couple. 9
There are α i entrepreneur couples. If the man dies first, we observe him (as a married male) with certainty, and his wife as a widow with frequency γ i . In principle, γ i can be any positive number, but we focus on γ i ∈ [0, 1], which would be the case if husbands do not pass all their wealth to their widows or widows de-cumulate or pursue tax-avoidance strategies. 10
If the woman dies first, we observe her with frequency c, which reflects (but is not equal to) her share of property. We will often assume that c = 0, i.e., the wife of an entrepreneur is not sufficiently wealthy to appear in the top group. The polar case is that of c = 1, i.e., the wife is as wealthy as her husband. We will vary the value of c to represent the strength of the community property rules across states. The widower may pursue tax avoidance and de-cumulate. We allow for this possibility by assuming that we observe the husband in such cases with frequency σ i .
To complete the model, we posit that the probability of a wife dying first is equal to b i and is the same for the rentier and entrepreneur families. In sum, we observe various gender/marital combinations with the frequencies specified in Table 1 
where S i is the sum of the numerators in all four conditions.
9 Our qualitative conclusions would not be affected by a different but constant sex ratio (with non-zero women). 10 γi could be greater than one reflecting large inter-spousal bequests and/or wealth effectively controlled by the wife, augmented by additional wealth accumulation that could take place following the death of the husband (which would introduce into the top groups some wives with "absent husbands").
Estimation. We observe shares of the marital/gender categories in the data for each year i.
Because the shares add to one in any given year, we have three independent moment conditions specified in Table 1 . The model includes five parameters: b i , c, α i , γ i and σ i , four of which vary by time, as indicated by the subscript i. We assume the values for b i and c as discussed below and, in our baseline specification, estimate the remaining three parameters -σ i , γ i and α i -for each year i. Since there is no cross-dependence across years, this procedure amounts to solving a (quadratic) system of three equations in three unknowns for each year.
This procedure may be interpreted as a very simple calibration exercise. Equivalently, it amounts to a just-identified method-of-moments approach where we match predictions of our structural model with three unknown parameters to three independent moment estimates, i.e., the means of three (out of four) dummies for gender/marital status categories.
This approach is very demanding -it requires estimating three parameters for each year -but it has the advantage of imposing little structure on the evolution of parameters over time.
As an alternative, we will consider a more parsimonious empirical model that imposes more structure on the parameters. Rather than attempt to estimate separate values of α, γ and σ for each year, we will assume that each of these parameters is a smooth function of time.
More specifically, in order to test for the U-shaped pattern of α, we assume that they are all quadratic functions: α(t) = α 0 + α 1 (t − 1925)/100 + α 2 ((t − 1925)/100) 2 , and analogously for σ and γ. Our estimation procedure amounts to estimating a system of nonlinear equations using information for all years simultaneously and is described in the Data Appendix.
Discussion. A closer inspection of the formulae shows that we can readily derive the solution for α i by combining the share of married women and the share of married men. These shares are equal to the expressions shown in the table that depend only on α i and constants divided by the sum of all categories. As a result, by dividing them through each other we obtain a single equation in one unknown, α i : married women year i married men year i
Intuitively, for the self-made, the extent to which we see married women depends on the extent to which a wife shared the wealth generated by the husband. Once we know (assume) the marital property sharing rule, c, and the probability of a husband dying first, b i , the number of first-dying women relative to first-dying men reflects the influence of α i only.
Denoting the (known) term on the left hand side by r i , we can write the solution for α i as
Thus, more married women (relative to married men) in a given year indicates more rentiers (lower α i ), for a constant c. Formally, equation 1 is decreasing in r i as long as c < 1 (which we consider the relevant range). The intuition is simply that while married, the wife is more likely to be wealthy in a rentier families than in a self-made family.
The model imposes some simple (though weak) testable predictions: since α i ∈ [0, 1], we must have that
. This can be shown to be equivalent to min{c, 1} < r i < max{c, 1}. Making the natural assumption that c < 1, it follows that c < r i < 1. For c ≥ 0, the necessary condition for this condition to hold is that r i ∈ (0, 1). Knowing the value of b i , we can directly verify this condition from the data. In addition, if we know the value of c, we can further tighten this restriction.
While the value of α i can be derived with no reference to the shares of widows and widowers, the model imposes additional restrictions due to the presence of these groups. We know that γ i and σ i must be non-negative. Given the solution for α i , the equations for widows and widowers are linear in γ i and σ i , and so is the sum of all four terms. Consequently, the explicit solutions for γ i and σ i can be easily derived as solutions of linear equations. Whether the values implied by these solutions are positive is testable.
There are two confounding factors in the model. First, the frequency of observing married men and married women depends on b i , the likelihood that a woman dies first. We cannot estimate b i from our model. Therefore, we estimate the actual likelihood using the IPUMS census data for 1920 through 2000 combined with mortality rates from Social Security mortality tables (further described in the Appendix). The estimated value of b i was 0.4 in 1920. It was falling until the 1980 Census when it reached its minimum at slightly over 0.27 and it subsequently increased to slightly over 0.30. 11
11 An additional assumption that we make is that bi is the same for rentier and entrepreneur couples. We verified this assumption using pooled SCF data for 1989-2001. We defined the "wealthy" as those in the top 1% of wealth distribution in each year and as rentiers those who reported inheritance of at least $5 million in 2004 dollars (the value of inheritance was supposed to be reported at the time it was received, we applied a 5% real rate of return to obtain present value). We then estimated b for rentiers and the rest (self-made) in the same manner as for the Census data. The estimated value of b for rentiers was 0.314 and for self-made it was 0.322.
Varying the rate of return, the threshold for the wealthy group and for being a rentier made b vary between 0.29 and 0.38 with no clear pattern for which group dominates. Second, the extent to which the wife shares wealth in entrepreneur couples, c, clearly influences the number of married women at any given level of α i . 12 Since states differ in their treatment of property acquired during marriage, we estimate the model separately for states with different property regimes. There are three regimes to consider: community property, common law, and equitable distribution. Eight states were community property states throughout our study period, meaning that property acquired during marriage was considered marital property. 13 The remaining states were common law states where property formerly was allocated according to title. However, with greater incidence of divorce, this system was deemed unfair as it exposed many wives to financial hardship on divorce. Therefore, a number of states applied the principle of equitable distribution, i.e., divorce judges would allocate assets according to fairness. 14 Equitable distribution was already in place in 25 states in 1970 (Gray, 1998) , and by 1994 the remaining eight states had adopted equitable distribution (Weisberg and Appleton, 2002) . We code states according to their status in 1970, following Gray (1998 ,   Table 1 ), where common law states are those that allocated property according to title.
Another concern is the possibility that c changed over time. It is conceivable that c has increased over time (e.g., the aforementioned shift towards equitable distribution).. Nevertheless, from the discussion above it is clear higher value of c leads to a higher estimate of α. Hence, allowing c to increase over the period when α is estimated to be increasing would further strengthen this pattern. We will find that α has been increasing over the past 30 years.
Thus, our assumption of a constant c is conservative with respect to this key finding. We will return to this issue in Section 4.
Model results We estimated our model using data for decedents for all of the U.S. and then separately for common law and non-common law states. For illustration, we present in Figure 3 the underlying moments of data -shares of gender/marital status categories in the top 0.01% -for all states. The results for α i are shown on Figure 4a for both all states and common law states, under assumption that c = 0. To smooth the series, we use shares defined 12 However, the direction in which αi moves with changes in the ratio of married women to married men does not depend on the chosen value of c, since equation 1 is decreasing in r as long as c < 1 (which we consider the relevant range).
13 Arizona, California, Idaho, Louisiana, Nevada, New Mexico, Texas, and Washington. Wisconsin changed from equitable distribution to community property in 1986. When we split the sample with respect to the marital property regime, we exclude Wisconsin. 14 The length of the marriage and the non-market contributions of the financially weaker spouse are among the factors considered.
based on years t − 2 to t + 2, when available. The results for α i , σ i , and γ i are in Figures A-1a (all) and A-1b (common law). The figures show a marked decline in the share of entrepreneurs until the 1970s and then an increase. This pattern is much more pronounced in common law states.
The corresponding results based on the parametric approach that allows for α, γ and σ to change as a quadratic function of time are presented in Table 3 . Our hypothesis is that α 2 > 0 and that the minimum (equal to 1925 − 100
) falls at some point in the 1960s or 1970s.
Furthermore, the model assumes that γ(t) > 0 and σ(t) > 0. When we attempt to estimate the model on the full sample, we find that α 2 is indeed positive but insignificant, with the minimum not falling in the expected region. However, there is no evidence either that γ(t) or σ(t) are anything but constants. We can improve the power of the method by restricting those two parameters to be constant over time. As the second specification shows, the corresponding results are very much in line with our story; the implied pattern is also shown in Figure 4a .
The minimum level of α is estimated to take place in 1973, with alpha bottoming out at 0.33, down from the maximum of 0.74. All of the parameters fall within the economically sensible region -γ and σ are positive and well below one, while the range of α is contained between 0 and 1. We then repeat the analogous experiment for the common law states. As argued before, the model is likely to perform better for such states. This is indeed what we find even without imposing restrictions on γ and σ. The results are qualitatively similar to those based on the full sample, with added significance. The model does worse for the remaining states, although once γ and σ are restricted to be constant, the quadratic pattern is again present and significant. In that case though the restriction that γ > 0 is now violated.
One reason to favor the results from common law states is that our model performs worse on other dimensions in equitable distribution and community property states. In the unrestricted specification, common law states are the only ones for which the non-negativeness restrictions imposed by the model on the values of γ i and σ i are not rejected. This may be because our models perform better for low c, and arguably, c is the lowest in common law states. For c = 1 our model cannot distinguish between entrepreneur and rentier wealth (α i is not identified).
Also, for values of c close to 1, we would expect much greater sensitivity of results to sampling variation and measurement error, a problem that is exacerbated by the fact that the sample size for community property and equitable distribution states is much smaller. 15
Sensitivity of the results to the assumed value of c is investigated in Figure 4b . As discussed in the previous section, higher values of c have a monotonic effect on the value of α. Even for c as low as 0.1, the implied value of α in common law states can be greater than one hence rejecting the model. While the choice of c matters for the actual value of α, these figures illustrate that its choice has no effect on the qualitative conclusion regarding the time-pattern of the share of entrepreneurial wealth.
Assuming that c = 0 is particularly problematic for the non-common law states. Hence, we repeat our parametric approach using a higher value of c, c = 0.2, with the results presented in the corresponding columns of Table 3 . This change has no qualitative implications for any of the groups of states, in each case preserving the quadratic pattern. Given the results shown on The decline in the share of women in the top group was more pronounced among the living than decedents. Therefore, we would like to estimate our model on the former group as well. However, the model was formulated for the decedent population and cannot match the data for the living (who are younger and consequently more married). A model for the living would have to give greater weight to married individuals, how much higher we do not know.
However, considering only those who are married in the full population, clearly there must be equal numbers of men and women. Thus, the extent to which we observe more married men than married women among the wealthy would be driven by α i , the share of entrepreneurs (for a constant c = 1). In terms of our model, equations for the number of married men and married women remain valid with b i = 0.5, while equations for widowed men and women do not because they should be multiplied by the unknown survival factors. As before, the solution for α i can be derived based on equations for married men and women only. Assuming that c = 0 and b i = 0.5, we have that α i = (1 −r i )/(1 +r i ), wherer i = married women year i married men year i . Figure 4c shows the estimate of α i thus obtained from data for the living both for all and just for common law states. An advantage of this approach is that the estimate of the share of entrepreneurs is independent of the constructed value of b i . Again, α i follows a U-shaped pattern.
of the order of 10% or less of wealthy decedents and common law states made up over 60%.
Singles
The never married (henceforth, singles) can provide further evidence on the relative importance of inherited vs. self-made wealth. If, as before, sons and daughters inherit equally, but only men make wealth, then all single women inherited. Assume for now similar marriage ages for rentier men and women, then the number of single men in excess of single women would be due to self-made wealth. Figure 5a (5b) shows the fraction of decedent (living) single men and women respectively for P99.90-100. 16 Figure 6a (6b) shows the implied fraction of entrepreneurs. Note that the implied fraction of entrepreneurs indeed follows a U-shaped pattern. 17
The evidence from the singles is particularly interesting since arguably the gender composition in this group is relatively invariant to changes in the tax code, marital deduction in particular.
While not definitive, these findings do line up with other evidence. A possible objection is that rentier men may marry at substantially different ages than rentier women. For instance if men married later, we would see more single men. Also, a U-shaped pattern for the excess of single men over single women could be driven by a similar movement in the marriage age gap, although we are not aware of such a movement in the marriage mores of heirs and heiresses.
Rich-lists and IPUMS evidence
The 16 Single individuals are overall a small fraction and therefore we need to define the top category more widely. 17 There were more women then men in 1969 and 1976 and thus the estimate of the fraction of entrepreneurs is negative for these years. While clearly this cannot be the case, treating death as a random sampling device, this is what we would expect to estimate with probability .5 if there were no self-made wealth at all (and thus equally many men and women among the wealthy). Another possibility is that there were more unmarried heiresses than unmarried heirs, for instance due to the former marrying later than the latter. Table 4 lists, by year, the number (and share) of women on the list, and specifically those who had inherited their wealth. It is noteworthy that while women make up 45-50% of those who inherited wealth, their share among the self-made is substantially lower (6.6% in 2003).
Moreover, the drop in the share of women is mirrored by a drop in the share of individuals who inherited wealth. In 1982, more than one third had inherited, whereas by 2003 this fraction had more than halved. 18 The importance of inheritance for women's wealth is hardly new. The list of some 4,000 millionaires in 1892 published by the New York Tribune showed a much greater fraction of women among those who had inherited than those who were self-made, Table 6 . A similar pattern emerges from A Classification of American Wealth, Table 5 . While the number of observations is small for the early years and the fraction of women varies widely, the last three data points are most relevant for us. In 1900-1950, the fraction of women among those who had inherited wealth was fairly steady and around 60 percent (no women were self-made).
Moreover, for the period 1875-1950 these data show a steady increase in the role of inherited wealth, consistent with our hypothesis that the rise in the share of women in the estate tax data is linked to inherited wealth playing an increasingly important role. 19 Further evidence for the importance of entrepreneurs can be obtained from the censuses.
Using the IPUMS data, we calculate the fraction of the labor force that is self-employed, and, for some years, employers. These data show that entrepreneurship, so measured, indeed 
Significance
We have demonstrated several pieces of evidence supporting our hypothesis that wealth mobility in the 20 th century followed a U-shaped pattern. We consider (and largely dismiss) alternative explanations for the empirical patterns in the next section, which may skipped by readers convinced by the above analysis. Other than shedding light on the evolution of wealth mobility, these findings are of significance because they contribute to two important economic questions. First, the increase in the importance of self-made wealth since the 1970s is consistent with the notion that general-purpose technological revolutions (such as the information technology (IT) revolution) favor new over old capital (Greenwood and Jovanovic, 1999; Hobijn and Jovanovic, 2001) . Second, the implied process of obsolescence of old wealth and creation of new wealth can offer a reconciliation of the diverging patterns in wealth and income concentration over the past 30 years. We elaborate on these issues in Section 5.
Alternative Explanations
We now turn to alternative explanations: changes to the estate tax code, changing norms, divorce and remarriage, and changes to the geographic distribution of the population. The marital deduction arose as a means of correcting a perceived inequity in the tax treatment of estates between community and non-community property states. In the community property states, half of the community property would be automatically subject to the estate tax while in non-community property states an exclusion would be granted only if the surviving spouse could be shown to have contributed to the acquisition of property. The introduction of marital deduction in 1948 was preceded by the 1942 legislation that attempted to tax community property, unless a reason for exception as in non-community property states could be established (Luckey, 1995) . We investigate the relevance of the community property rules in what follows.
is of most interest (we have no data to study the 1948 change, and the 1976 extension did not affect higher wealth categories).
The 1981 introduction of unlimited marital deductions made it more advantageous to transfer assets to the surviving spouse at death (as opposed to an inter vivos transfer) -and as shown in Figure 8 , marital deductions increased sharply after 1976 (our last year of data available prior to 1981). A priori, we would expect a reduction in spousal inter vivos transfers and transfers to others (inter vivos or at death), and an increase in the net worth (as observed at death) of the married. The initial effect would be to make the wealthy wealthier, more likely to be married and more male. Subsequently, we would expect wealth held at death by widows (widowers) to increase (since, presumably, they inherited more), partly offsetting the initial "gains" of married men (women).
This is roughly what we find for the decedents, The estimate of α i in the model section decreases in r i , the ratio of married women to married men. Thus, if unlimited marital deduction resulted in a decline in r (relatively more married men), then the rise in α i seen in Figure 4a may reflect tax changes rather than greater entrepreneurship. The effect of marital deduction on the relative number of married men and married women is difficult to assess. By reducing the penalty for holding on to wealth, the incentive to pursue tax avoidance after the 1981 reform likely weakened for both groups. As a result, both the number of married men and the number of married women should have increased. It is unclear whether such an effect, if any, was stronger for men or women. It is certainly possible that married men pursued more aggressive tax avoidance strategies prior to the introduction of unlimited marital deduction and that therefore their reported wealth increased by more than the wealth of married women.
Looking at lower wealth groups may shed some light on the issue. Less wealthy use the 23 A possible explanation is that widowed women were more likely to remarry.
marital deduction more extensively, see Figure 8 , which would suggest that the 1981 changes had a stronger effect on their gender-marital composition. As figure 10 illustrates, the share of married females in the remainder of the top .4% increased between 1976 and 1982, 24 with no similar effect for the share of married men, thus suggesting a stronger response for married women than married men. Given these patterns for the lower wealth categories, we suspect that marital deductions cannot fully explain developments at the very top -the rise in married men specifically.
Another factor potentially influencing the gender composition of estate taxpayers is its graduation. We would expect greater graduation to increase the tendency to split taxable estates when marital transfers were taxable (the case prior to 1948, and to some extent until 1982). One way of accomplishing this objective was by sharing wealth more equally while alive. Moreover, absent marital deductions, a couple aiming to maximize wealth holdings of the surviving spouse should tilt assets towards the spouse who is more likely to survive. Both of these factors would result in more women among the wealthy as the graduation of tax rates increased. Effective marginal tax rates for the estate in the top .01% were in fact increasing until the 1970s (driven by rates changes prior to 1945 and falling real value of thresholds due to inflation after that (Kopczuk and Saez, 2004a, figure 10)) and stabilizing after that until 2001. Therefore, changes in estate taxation could have contributed to an increase in the share of women until the 1970s. Thus, the increase in the share of women in the early part is consistent with increasing graduation of the estate tax leading to a more even distribution of assets between spouses. However, graduation of the tax schedule cannot account for the later decline.
For a number of reasons, however, it appears unlikely that marital deductions were the sole driving force behind the fall in the share of women. First, while there was an increase in married men in the top group, the lower wealth group saw no such increase. Arguably, the lower wealth group was more affected. Second, evidence from the Forbes 400 list reveals a strong link between the importance of inherited wealth and the fraction of women, both declining steadily in the last two decades. Lastly, we should bear in mind the results for singles. Tax considerations have no direct implications for the frequency of observing single males vs. single females. Thus, the fact that evidence from the single population on the share of entrepreneurs shows a similar pattern to that obtained from married couples (and widows 24 Note that P99.6-P99.99 contains 39 times as many individuals as top .01% so that the presence of individuals moving between P99.6-P99.99 and Top .01% has a minor effect on the gender composition of the larger group.
and widowers) suggests that changes to the tax code have not been the main factor driving the share of women among the wealthy.
Changing norms It may be that what is considered a fair division of assets between spouses
has changed over time. While this might explain the rise in the fraction of women seen in the 1925-1969 period, it is less clear that it can account for the decline since, although the nofault divorce revolution has been associated with negative economic consequences for women.
Assuming that women in the concerned group have more to lose from divorce, their bargaining position would have worsened, which would show up as married women owning a lower share of household wealth. However, the decline of women at the top of the wealth distribution seems driven not by married women but by widows, thus casting doubt on this explanation.
While difficult to pin down, the lower wealth categories provide some evidence on changes to what is considered a fair share. The reason is twofold. First, wealth distribution is more skewed than income distribution and therefore we would expect that at lower wealth categories the bulk of wealth was not inherited. Thus, for a sufficiently low wealth category, self-made wealth will dominate. Second, at lower wealth levels, the wife's entitlement is more likely to be a fixed share of household wealth than at higher wealth levels (where this share is likely to decline with wealth). For instance, in the much publicized divorce of the Wendts in 1995, the wife claimed 50% of the husband's estimated 100 million dollar wealth but was only awarded 20 million on the ground that this would be sufficient to maintain the standard of living she had grown accustomed to. In other words, the wife's entitlement may only extend to consumption, not savings, and savings increase faster than consumption with household wealth. more women in the lower wealth category, but the difference is falling rapidly and by the 1940s, there were relatively more women in the top group. This reverses in the 1970s. Since then, the fraction women has held steady in the lower wealth categories and the difference is driven by fewer women at the top.
This U-shaped pattern suggests that the rise and decline of the fraction women in the top group cannot be accounted for by changes in the norms governing allocation of assets between spouses. The negative values for the 1940s through the 1970s is consistent with inherited wealth being (relatively) more important in the top group (unless wives in the top group received a higher share of wealth generated by husbands than wives in lower groups, which we find implausible).
It should also be noted that daughters' being allocated a greater share of estates may have contributed to the more rapid rise in the fraction of women in the top wealth group. While equal division of estates became the norm among the less wealthy already in the late 19 th century, we know less about the very wealthy and it may be that they continued to favor sons, albeit at a decreasing rate, well into the 20 th century. One piece of evidence against this is our (Betzig and Weber, 1995) . Finally, we are not aware of any tendency since the 1960s and onwards to increasingly favor sons.
Divorce and remarriage Easier divorce could lead to fewer women in the top wealth category if the upshot were that wealthy men spread their wealth over more wives. There were two waves of divorce law liberalization in the last century. The first took place in the 1930s and involved a few states and Mexico (a "loophole" in the divorce law recognizing divorces filed for there). The second wave, the so called "no-fault" revolution, took place in the 1970s, following
California's removing fault grounds for divorce in 1969. Both waves of reforms are visible in our data (not shown). However, had the decline of women among the very wealthy been driven by serial monogamy on the part of men, we would have expected an increase in divorced women in the lower categories, something we do not observe. The rise in divorcées attributable to the later wave is confined to the top group. While it is possible that divorcées do not show up as such because of remarriage, we find it unlikely that remarriage would eliminate all traces of increased "polygyny."
Geographic composition As mentioned, in eight (mostly western) community property states, all wealth accumulated during marriage is owned jointly by husband and wife by default. Women are wealthier in community property states (for some years even wealthier than men), and it is thus conceivable that changes to the demographic composition of the wealthy affects the gender wealth distribution. A growing share of the wealthy living in community property states may have contributed to the nationwide increase in the share of women in the early period, although the share of women in top wealth groups grew in both types of states.
However, geographic composition cannot account for the decline of women in the later period since that would have required a decline in the fraction living in community property states,
the opposite of what happened (not shown).
In sum, several factors may have contributed to the development of the share of women among the wealthy. The increase is consistent with a shift of the population towards community property states, increasing graduation of the estate tax, and changing social norms emphasizing economic equality between the sexes. However, these factors are unlikely to have played a role in the subsequent decline. The migration to community property states observed in the later period would predict a counterfactual increase in the fraction of women. The graduation of the tax system did not change much in the later period, and while it is possible that women lost out in terms of intra-household bargaining power in the later part of the century, the fact that women have not lost ground in the lower wealth categories is inconsistent with such an interpretation. Changes in the tax treatment of marital transfers may have played a role in the decline, in particular, the unlimited marital deduction introduced in 1981. However, evidence from the population of singles, a group arguably unaffected by such changes, suggests that this cannot be the sole factor.
Summary and Discussion
If men make but women inherit great fortunes, then the share of women at the top of the wealth distribution would reflect the relative importance of self-made over inherited wealth and thus inter-generational wealth mobility. This is the interpretation we have given The share of women among the very wealthy may also related inversely to technological change. In times of rapid technological change, self-made entrepreneurs displace old wealth.
If the self made tend to be men, the share of women declines. By contrast, when technological change is more incremental, old fortunes prevail and as wealth at the top of the distribution becomes more dynastic, the share of women increases.
We have presented some evidence of an inverse relationship between between the share of women among the very wealthy and entrepreneurship from the IPUMS (the fraction of the workforce who are employers). We conclude with a fuller discussion of how our interpretation of the evolution of the share of women relates to the literature on technological change and the distribution of income and wealth.
Equating women with inherited wealth, entrepreneurship would have followed a U-shaped pattern over the past century. Such a pattern fits the timing of the so called second and third industrial revolutions. The period in which we see a rise in the share of women follows on the heels of a period of major inventions (electrification and the internal combustion engine) but is itself not one. According to Jovanovic and Rousseau (2003, p. 419) : "It seems to us that the periods 1890-1930 and 1971-2001 saw more creative destruction than the period 1930-1970." Thus, the initial rise in the share of women in the 1925-1969 period may be attributed to the passing down of fortunes generated during the "Gilded Age" (circa .
The IT revolution, with a start date in the early 1970s, coincides with the decline of women in our data. One reason why inventions (as opposed to innovations) are likely to encourage entrepreneurship and generate new fortunes large enough to replace existing ones at the top is that rapid technological change renders existing capital obsolete and favors new firms (Greenwood and Jovanovic, 1999; Hobijn and Jovanovic, 2001 ). New firms, in turn, tend to be more closely held, owned primarily by the entrepreneurs themselves. Thus, technological change may propel founders of firms that successfully adapt the new technology to the top of the wealth distribution. If founders are primarily men, we would expect rapid technological change to result in the top of the wealth distribution being both more male and less "dynastic,"
and the share of women to rise in its aftermath as wealth is passed down.
Our hypothesis is also largely consistent with the fact that the fraction of women in the top wealth group moved in opposite direction of income inequality over the study period -if indeed spurts of economic growth coincide with the generation of new fortunes and greater inequality.
While the increase in wage inequality since the 1970s has been linked to rapid technological change, e.g., Juhn et al. (1993) , Katz and Autor (1999) , there has been less focus to date on the potential role of its absence for understanding the decline in inequality in the 1930s and 1940s, and continued low levels through the 1950s and 1960s (Galor and Tsiddon (1997) being an exception). Instead, macro-economic shocks such as the Great Depression, World War II;
egalitarian social norms and -their possible expressions -policy measures such as income and estate taxation, anti-trust legislation and the GI bill have been given more weight, e.g., Goldin and Margo (1992) , Piketty (2003) , Piketty and Saez (2003) , Kopczuk and Saez (2004a) .
While norms are important, they may be viewed as endogenous outcomes.
Women as a proxy for old wealth complements the approach of Piketty and Saez (2003);
Piketty (2003) who have interpreted a high share of capital income to indicated the importance of rentiers. Our approach has the advantage of not relying on the distinction between labor and capital income, a distinction that may not be meaningful for business owners and may be sensitive to changes in corporate structure and taxation. If the question is whether the wealthy are thus because of their own industriousness, the gender wealth composition may shed additional light.
Our hypothesis that the share of women reflects the role of inherited wealth among the wealthy, and thus wealth mobility, is primarily a story about the top wealth brackets. For lower wealth brackets, the decline was absent. There are several possible explanations for this. In lower wealth categories, the wife's entitlement is more likely to be a share of household assets than at higher wealth levels. Moreover, the wealth needed to enter, for instance, the top 1 percent (corresponding to the richest 2 million adults) was "only" about one in lower wealth groups, women's greater earnings, and, to some extent, a trickle-down from higher wealth groups.
Finally, we propose a potential explanation for why wealth concentration remained constant in the past 25 years despite the surge in income concentration. Figures 2a and 2b show that wealth concentration declined in the 1970s. We speculate that this reflected the erosion of old wealth and that wealth concentration would have fallen further still if not for the inflow of new fortunes generated by the IT revolution in the 1980s and thereafter. There are primarily two reasons for why old wealth would decline. First, assuming that the old wealth dates from the Gilded Age, dilution from passing down the generations (because of its spread over more people, estate taxation, consumption) would result in a reduction in wealth concentration.
Second, the decline in concentration in the 1970s is likely driven by the stock market which has been connected to the arrival of new technology and the period of "creative destruction"
noted by Jovanovic and co-authors.
Data Appendix

A Estate tax data
Estate tax tabulations were performed on the confidential data available through the Statistics of Income division of the Internal Revenue Service. We define net worth as the difference between gross estate and debts. Given the overall population and weights assigned to each observations, we tabulated the number of individuals by gender, marital status and marital property regime of the state of residence for the top 0.01%, P99.9-P99.99 and so on. Tabulations for "decedents" use adult deaths as the population basis. Methodology for constructing estimates for the "living population" is identical as in Kopczuk and Saez (2004b), we review it briefly here and refer the reader to the extensive appendix in that paper for more detailed discussion.
The estate multiplier method relies on the assumption that decedents are randomly selected from the living population. Then, given the probability of dying by m i , a single estate observation stands for
observations. This is the weight that is attached to any given observation. Implementing the method requires appropriate mortality rates. Mortality tables were obtained from the Human Mortality Database (www.mortality.org) and rely on the life tables constructed by the Office of the Actuary of the Social Security Administration (see Bell et al., 1992 , for a full description of the methodology). While it is well known that mortality rates are negatively correlated with socioeconomic status, the extent and trends in the mortality gradient for the population considered here is not known. We follow Kopczuk and Saez (2004b) and adjust mortality rates for socioeconomic status using estimates of white college-educated mortality differentials obtained by Brown et al. (2002) . The extensive appendix in Kopczuk and Saez (2004b) discusses evidence on the evolution of mortality differentials over time.
We classify states into marital property regimes in 1970 following Gray (1998, 
B Census data
We rely on the IPUMS (Ruggles et al., 2004) 
Estimation of b
We estimate the likelihood that the wife dies first by assigning to every individual in the IPUMS a mortality rate based on gender, age and year. In the baseline calculation, we weight each married or widowed individual by the mortality risk. The total number of families with one spouse dying in a given year is obtained by adding up these weights, while the total number of such families in which woman was the-first-to-die is obtained by adding up weights for married females and widowed men. Our parameter b i is the ratio of the latter to the former. This procedure yields values of b i for Census years and we use cubic spline to interpolate values in intermediate years.
The intuition for this procedure is as follows. Consider a universe of married couples whose members will be observed in the decedent population in the year they pass (a couple has two members until one of them passes and then one member until that person passes). Assume further that only one member of a couple dies in any given year (adjusting the mortality rate for married spouses for the possibility of dying in the same year by assigning each of them a probability of 1/2 of dying first has a trivial effect). Then, we can estimate b i , the probability that a wife dies first, by the number of couples in which the woman died first divided by the total number of couples experience a death in any given year. The numerator could be estimated by adding the mortality rates for all married women and widowed men. To obtain the denominator, we add to the numerator the added mortality rates for all married men and widowed women.
We considered two variations of this procedure. First, we corrected mortality rates using socio-economic mortality differentials as in Kopczuk and Saez (2004a) . Second, we linked records for spouses and corrected weights for the possibility of the two spouses dying in the same year by subtracting for each of them a half of the product of mortality rates of both spouses. Both of these adjustments had very minor effect on b i and no discernible effect on the estimates, the actual values we are using in the paper are based on the last approach. 39.6 in 1920, 37.4 in 1930, 35.1 in 1940, 32.9 in 1950, 30.3 in 1960, 28.9 in 1970, 27.3 in 1980, 27.3 in 1990 and 30.4 in 2000.
C Gender and Inheritances
None On the other hand, the list often includes titles (e.g., mrs, miss, lady, mme, princess etc.) that are more informative than first names (e.g., the form of Mrs. John Smith is very common). It also includes short descriptions of the source of wealth that in many cases allow for identifying gender (e.g., a person may be referred to as a "daughter," "widow," "niece,"
or a phrase such as "left her," "from her" and so on can be used). We use a simple pattern matching algorithm to identify all such cases and classify them as women. We supplement it with matching on first names as described above, with classification based on the titles and description taking precedence (so that we do not mis-classify Mrs. John Smith). We assign individuals an inheritance dummy based on the description, again using pattern matching to identify phrases indicating inheritance.
D Restricted Model
The restricted version of the model described in section 3.1 is based on the set of conditions in Table 1 , augmented by the parametric restrictions imposed on the evolution of α i , γ i and
, where for the ease of exposition t(i) = (i − 1925)/100. Denoting the indicator of marital status by I (I ∈ {m, w}) and gender by G (G ∈ {M, F }), the model takes the form of a system of four nonlinear equations
where S(i) is defined so that the probabilities add up to one. Because these four conditions are linearly dependent by construction, one of them is redundant, without loss of generality we ignore the last one. The independent variables in this model are b i , i and i 2 , and we are attempting to estimate nine parameters: α 0 , α 1 , α 2 , γ 0 , γ 1 , γ 2 , σ 0 , σ 1 and σ 2 .
Our data takes the form of annual tabulations by gender and marital status, this is of course equivalent to having individual observations of gender and marital status. There are 6353 decedents in years covered by our data who belong to the top .01% and are either married or widowed. We define three dummy variables D mF , D wM and D mM corresponding to the marital/gender categories in the three equations. We replace the probabilities in the system of equations by the corresponding dummy variables and specify the empirical specification as
We estimate the system jointly using nonlinear least squares. Because the error terms are likely to be correlated, we account for it relying on the seemingly unrelated regression approach. This procedure is straightforwardly implemented using "proc model " in SAS. We cannot exclude the possibility of heteroskedasticity. For one thing, the number of observations varies over time as population grows. Hence, our standard errors are based on heteroskedasticity-consistent covariance matrix. Specifically, we use the conservative "jackknife" approximation suggested by Davidson and MacKinnon (p. 554 1993) due to its good small sample performance. Estimates based on the model described in Setion 3.1. Estimates labeled "quadratic" correspond to specifications #2 and #5 in Source: Estimates of the unrestricted model described in Section 3.1 using data for common law states.
